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The Interpretive Exercise under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 




According to subsection 245(4) of the Income Tax Act (the Act)1 the general anti-
avoidance rule (“GAAR”) applies to an avoidance transaction only if it is reasonable to 
consider that the transaction would, but for the GAAR, result directly or indirectly in a 
misuse of one or more provisions of the Act or other relevant enactments, including tax 
treaties, or an abuse having regard to those provisions other than the GAAR read as a 
whole.2 Subsection 245(4) was added to the GAAR to ensure that it does not apply to “tax-
motivated transactions that are otherwise in accordance with the object and spirit of the 
provisions of the Act,”3 and  “draws a line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive 
tax avoidance” by asking whether the avoidance transaction at issue is consistent with, or 
frustrates or defeats, the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions.4 For this 
reason, application of the GAAR ultimately depends on an interpretive exercise to 
determine the object, spirit, and purpose of these provisions. 
 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, Tax LLM Program, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British 
Columbia. 
1 RSC 1985 c. 1 (as amended). 
2 Although the French version of the ITA uses the same word, “abus,” instead of separate words misuse and 
abuse, it distinguishes between an abuse in the application of one or more of the provisions of the ITA and 
other relevant enactments, including tax treaties (“dans l’application des dispositions d’un ou de plusieurs 
des textes suivant”), and an abuse in the application of those provisions read as a whole (dans l’application 
de ces dispositions … lues dans leur ensemble”). 
3 David Dodge, “A New and More Coherent Approach to Tax Avoidance” (1988), 36:1 Canadian Tax 
Journal 1, at 20. 
4 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, at paragraphs 16 and 57 (Canada Trustco). 
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Since the object, spirit, and purpose of a provision is also taken into account under 
the “textual, contextual and purposive” (TCP) approach to the interpretation of statutes 
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada,5 an obvious issue in the application of the 
misuse or abuse test is the relationship between “ordinary interpretation” under the TCP 
approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR. Another important issue in the 
application of this provision is the method by which the object, spirit, and purpose of 
provisions is construed in order to determine whether an avoidance transaction results in a 
misuse of specific provisions or an abuse having regard to provisions read as a whole. 
 
This chapter examines the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, contrasting this 
interpretive exercise with ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, and considering 
the way in which the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions is determined in 
order to decide whether an avoidance transaction is subject to the GAAR. The first part 
distinguishes the interpretive exercise under the GAAR from the TCP approach, explaining 
that ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach is rightly constrained by the text of the 
applicable provisions in a way that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR is not. The 
second part addresses the way in which the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant 
provisions is interpreted, criticizing the “unified textual, contextual and purposive” 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada,6 and 
arguing that separate inquiries into a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having 
regard to provisions read as a whole is not only consistent with the Court’s admonition in 
Canada Trustco against judicial reliance on overarching or overriding policies that are not 





5 Ibid., at paragraph 10. 
6 Ibid., at paragraphs 38 to 43. 
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I. The TCP Approach and the Interpretive Exercise Under the GAAR 
 
Although the object, spirit, or purpose of a provision is central to the interpretive 
exercise under the GAAR it also plays a role in the TCP approach. For this reason, it might 
be argued that this method of interpretation renders the GAAR irrelevant—since the 
application of the GAAR is not necessary to deny tax benefits where the relevant provisions 
are already interpreted in accordance with their object, spirit, and purpose to deny abusive 
transactions, and those provisions do not apply to transactions that are consistent with the 
object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions.7 Alternatively, it could be argued that 
the interpretive exercise under the GAAR presumes a literal approach to the ordinary 
interpretation of tax statutes and treaties, which is contrary to the TCP approach.8 
 
Both of these arguments find support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada 
Trustco, which repeatedly conflates the interpretive exercise under the GAAR with the 
TCP approach,9 and further states that the role of the GAAR is “to negate arrangements 
that would be permissible under a literal interpretation of other provisions” of the ITA.10 
In contrast, in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,11 the court clearly distinguishes the 
 
7 See, for example, Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule – Part 2” (1988), 
46:5 Canadian Tax Journal 1123 at 1172. 
8 See, for example, Brian J. Arnold, “Policy Forum: Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Approach to 
the Determination of Abuse Under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2014) 62:1 Canadian Tax Journal 
113 at 125-26. 
9 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 40, stating that there is “but one principle of interpretation”; at 
paragraph 47, stating that “subsection 245(4) requires the court to look beyond the mere text of the provisions 
and undertake a contextual and purposive approach to interpretation in order to find a meaning that 
harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the provisions”; at paragraph 51, stating that the 
provisions giving rise to a tax benefit “must be interpreted in their legislative context, together with other 
related and relevant provisions, in light of the purposes that are promoted by those provisions and their 
statutory schemes”; and at paragraph 58, stating that the “central issue” in the analysis of abusive tax 
avoidance is “the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions in light of their context and purpose.” I 
return to this point below; see the text accompanying notes 71 to 75. 
10 Ibid., at paragraph 13 [emphasis added]. 
11 2011 SCC 63 (Copthorne). 
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interpretative exercise under the GAAR from ordinary interpretation under the TCP 
approach, explaining that ordinary interpretation applies a “textual, contextual and 
purposive analysis to determine what the words of the statute mean,” whereas a GAAR 
analysis employs this approach to determine the object, spirit, or purpose of the relevant 
provisions or “rationale that underlies the words” in order to apply the misuse or abuse test 
in subsection 245(4).12 
 
The following sections examine the ordinary method of interpretation under the 
TCP approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, explaining how (and why) 
they differ. As the first section explains, although the TCP approach departs from literal 
interpretation by considering the broader context and purpose of a provision as well as its 
text, the text continues to play a dominant role in the interpretive process by limiting the 
influence of contextual and purposive considerations to plausible meanings of the relevant 
text and outweighing these other interpretive considerations where they conflict with the 
text. In contrast, as the second section explains, the function of the interpretive exercise 
under the GAAR is not to determine the meaning of the text, but to override this meaning 
in order to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result from an avoidance transaction 
that results in a misuse of the relevant provisions or an abuse having regard to the 
provisions as ordinarily interpreted. While in ordinary interpretation an emphasis on the 
text reflects rule of law principles of legal certainty and legislative supremacy, in the 
context of the GAAR, an emphasis on the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant 
provisions is justified to distinguish legitimate tax minimization from abusive tax 
avoidance. 
 
1. Textual, Contextual, and Purposive Interpretation 
 
According to E.A Driedger’s “modern rule” of statutory interpretation, “the words 
of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense 
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of 
 
12 Ibid., at paragraph 70. 
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Parliament.” 13  First endorsed by the Supreme Court in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. 
Canada,14 this method of interpretation was reaffirmed and renamed the TCP approach in 
Canada Trustco,15 and reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions as the approved 
method for interpreting tax legislation.16 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
establishes a similar approach for interpreting treaties, including tax treaties, and provides 
that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”17 
 
 Since a TCP approach provides that the words or terms of a provision are to be read 
“harmoniously with” or “in light of” their objects and purposes and the schemes of which 
they are a part, this method of interpretation differs from literal approaches such as strict 
construction or the plain meaning rule. Under strict construction, which was the dominant 
method for interpreting tax statutes in Canada until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stubart,18 tax provisions were interpreted literally, without any regard to their objects or 
 
13 E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 87. 
14 [1984] 1 SCR 536 at paragraph 61 (Stubart). 
15 Supra note 4, at paragraph 10, quoting Driedger’s modern rule and stating that “[t]he interpretation of a 
statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning 
that is harmonious with the Act as a whole.” 
16 See, for example, Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1, at paragraph 26; Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 
70; Craig v. Canada, 2012 SCC 43, at paragraph 38; and Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson, 2016 
SCC 21, at paragraph 32. 
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, UN doc. 
A/Conf. 39/27, fourth annex, UNTS 1155/331 (Vienna Convention). 
18 Supra note 15, at paragraph 60, referring to “the demise of the strict interpretation rule for the construction 
of taxing statutes.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of strict construction two years later in Golden 
v. The Queen, [1986] SCR 209, at paragraph 10, stating that strict construction “no longer finds a place in 
the canons of interpretation applicable to taxation statutes” and that the Stubart decision “recognized that in 
the construction of taxation statutes the law is not confined to a literal and virtually meaningless interpretation 
of the Act where the words will support on a broader construction a conclusion which is workable and in 
harmony with the evident purposes of the Act in question.” 
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purposes or the broader context of the schemes of which they are a part.19 Under the plain 
meaning rule that the Supreme Court affirmed from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the 
broader context and purpose of a provision could be considered only to resolve ambiguities 
resulting from a literal interpretation of the provision.20 In contrast to these methods of 
interpretation, the TCP approach allows contextual and purposive considerations to be 
taken into account in all circumstances, not only to resolve ambiguities but to reveal 
ambiguities where none might otherwise be apparent on a literal reading of the text. 
 
Although the TCP approach provides that the text of a provision should be read 
harmoniously with the scheme of which the provision is a part as well as with its objects 
and purposes, it is important to recognize that these interpretive considerations are not 
given equal weight. On the contrary, since the function of contextual and purposive 
analysis under the TCP approach is to determine the meaning of the relevant text, the text 
necessarily plays a leading role in the interpretive process, limiting the influence of 
contextual and purposive considerations and outweighing these considerations where they 
conflict with any plausible meaning of the text. This emphasis on the text reflects two core 
principles associated with the rule of law: (1) the principle of legislative supremacy, which 
requires courts to be attentive to the text that the legislature has approved in the form of 
legislation or the ratification of a treaty; and (2) a principle of legal certainty according to 
which persons should generally be able to rely on the apparent meaning of a legal text in 
order to govern their affairs.21 
 
As a result, under a TCP approach, while contextual and purposive considerations 
may displace the ordinary or literal meaning of a text, the alternative meaning that is 
 
19 For a detailed explanation, see David G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act—Part 1: Interpretive 
Doctrines” (1999), 47:3 Canadian Tax Journal 464, at 469-477. 
20 Ibid., at 504-517. 
21 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning” [1990] 42 Stanford Law Review 321 at 354. 
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selected must be a plausible meaning that the words are reasonably capable of bearing.22 
For example, in D & D Livestock Ltd. v. Canada,23 where the minister argued that a tax 
benefit (the duplication of safe income) resulting from a complex series of transactions 
carried out by the taxpayer should be denied because it was contrary to the object and 
purpose of subsection 55(2) of the Act (as it then read), the Tax Court rightly dismissed 
this argument on the grounds that the minister was asking the court “to give effect to the 
purpose of the subsection in spite of its wording rather than interpreting its wording in a 
manner which gives effect to its purpose.”24 Notably, however, the court emphasized that 
the minister can always challenge abusive transactions under the GAAR.25 
 
Moreover, where interpretive considerations point in different directions, a TCP 
approach weighs textual considerations more heavily than contextual and purposive 
considerations, and contextual considerations more heavily than purposive 
considerations.26 For example, in Stapley v. Canada,27 where the taxpayer sought to deduct 
the full cost of gift certificates for food and beverages and tickets to concerts and sporting 
events that he give to clients for promotional purposes, the Federal Court of Appeal relied 
on the text of subsection 67.1(1) and its context within the scheme of section 67.1 as a 
whole to conclude that the allowable deduction was limited to 50 percent of the amount 
claimed,28 notwithstanding its view that the application of the provision on the facts of the 
 
22 See, for example, Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell” [2003] 82 Canadian Bar 
Review 51 at 60, referring to the “plausible meaning rule” according to which a meaning that “give[s] effect 
to the actual or presumed intentions of the legislature, … must be one the words are capable of bearing.” 
23 2013 TCC 318 (D & D Livestock). 
24 Ibid., at paragraph 32, adding (at paragraph 33) that the TCP method of interpretation affirmed in Canada 
Trustco does not “give me the authority to simply re-write the subsection to give effect to its purpose.” 
25 Ibid., at paragraph 34. 
26 See, for example, David G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach” 
(1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal 741 at 795, arguing that a “pragmatic approach” to statutory interpretation 
accords “greater weight to apparently unambiguous words supported by their immediate context than to other 
elements of statutory meaning.” 
27 2006 FCA 36. 
28 Ibid., at paragraphs 12 to 21. 
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case would contradict the purpose of the provision to limit the deduction of expenses that 
include an element of personal consumption.29 According to the Court, “the statute dictates 
the result in this case.”30 
 
As a result, as the Supreme Court observed in Canada Trustco, although courts 
should always “seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole,” the “relative 
effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary.”31 
On the one hand, where the text of a provision is “precise and unequivocal,” the ordinary 
meaning of the text should play “a dominant role in the interpretive process.”32 On the 
other hand, where the text “can support more than one reasonable meaning,” “the ordinary 
meaning of the words plays a lesser role.”33 However, in each case, the text constrains the 
range of permissible interpretations, consistent with principles of legislative supremacy 
and legal certainty. 
 
 In addition, as the court also explained in Canada Trustco, because the Act is 
“dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific consequences,” the text of this statute 
itself invites “a largely textual interpretation”34—suggesting a greater emphasis on the text 
of most provisions of the Act than on their broader contexts or purposes. However, 
according to the court, this approach should not be confused with a literal or plain meaning 
approach, since contextual and purposive considerations may be relied on to “reveal or 
resolve latent ambiguities” even where the meaning of a particular provision “may not 




29 Ibid., at paragraphs 22-27. 
30 Ibid., at paragraph 31. 
31 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 10. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., at paragraph 13. 
35 Ibid., at paragraph 47. 
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2. The Interpretive Exercise under the GAAR 
 
 While the TCP approach regards the text of a provision as the primary consideration 
in its interpretation and takes the broader context and purpose of the provision into account 
in order to interpret the meaning of the text, the interpretive exercise under the GAAR 
reverses this order, relying on the object, spirit, or purpose of provisions to override their 
meaning as ordinarily interpreted in order to deny tax benefits that would otherwise result 
from avoidance transactions resulting in a misuse of specific provisions or an abuse having 
regard to these provisions read as a whole. As a result, as the Supreme Court stated in 
Copthorne,36 the GAAR is “a legal mechanism whereby Parliament has conferred on the 
court the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation” to deny tax benefits 
that would otherwise result from avoidance transactions that contradict the object, spirit, 
or purpose of the relevant provisions.37 Judith Freedman makes a similar point, observing 
that the interpretive exercise under general anti-avoidance rules and principles is “an 
unusual form of interpretation” that “goes beyond” what is normally understood as 
statutory interpretation.38 
 
 Since, unlike ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, this “unusual form 
of interpretation” is not constrained by the text, it is often argued that GAARs contradict 
the rule of law principle that laws should ideally be reasonably certain and predictable.39 
However, this departure from the principle of legal certainty is arguably consistent with 
the rule of law, on the grounds that it is necessary to discourage and counteract tax-
motivated transactions that undermine the integrity of the law by complying with the text 
 
36 Supra note 11. 
37 Ibid., at paragraph 66. 
38 Judith Freedman, “The Anatomy of Tax Avoidance Counteraction: Abuse of Law in a Tax Context at 
Member State and European Union Level,” in Rita de la Feria and Stefan Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of 
Abuse of Law: A New Principle of EU Law? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 365 at 375-76. 
39 See, for example, Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, “Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to 
Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study” (2010) 55 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 21 at 28-30. 
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of the relevant provisions without also adhering to their object, spirit, or purpose.40 As a 
result, while the principle of legal certainty generally prohibits courts from invoking the 
object, spirit, and purpose of a provision to override its meaning as ordinarily interpreted, 
this principle is legitimately superseded by an anti-abuse principle where an avoidance 
transaction is undertaken or arranged in order to obtain a tax benefit.41 
 
 In order to interpret the object, spirit, and purpose of a provision, courts necessarily 
consider the same interpretive sources to which they refer to determine the meaning of its 
text: the text itself, the broader context of related provisions that comprise a scheme of 
which the specific provision is a part, and extrinsic evidence of the provision’s purpose 
including the history of the relevant enactment and authoritative statements regarding its 
purpose.42  As a result, as the Supreme Court noted in Copthorne,43  the same textual, 
contextual, and purposive method of analysis that is used to determine the meaning of a 
provision under the TCP approach may also be used to identify its object, spirit, or purpose 
in a GAAR analysis. Although the method of analysis may be the same, the aim and 
function of the interpretive exercises differ, since the TCP approach applies a textual, 
contextual, and purposive analysis to determine what the words of the relevant provisions 
mean, while a GAAR analysis employs a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis to 
determine their object, spirit, or purpose.44 
 
 
40 David G. Duff, “General Anti-Avoidance Rules Revisited: Reflections on Tim Edgar’s ‘Building a Better 
GAAR’” (2020), 68:2 Canadian Tax Journal 579 at 589-591, arguing that, if properly designed, a GAAR is 
consistent with the rule of law. 
41 Ibid., at 595-596. 
42  See, for example, Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statues, 6th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2014), chapter 9, explaining that reasonable interpretations with respect to the purposes of 
legislative provisions are generally based on plausible inferences from the text of the provisions, the broader 
schemes of which they are a part, and the history of the relevant enactment, in addition to authoritative 
statements in extrinsic materials.  
43 Supra note 11, at paragraph 70. 
44 Ibid. 
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 To say that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR may result in the GAAR 
overriding the meaning of the text as ordinarily interpreted does not mean that the process 
of ordinary interpretation should revert to a literal approach in GAAR cases—although the 
Supreme Court, in several passages in Canada Trustco and Mathew v. Canada,45 appears 
to have assumed this relationship declaring that the purpose of the GAAR is to deny tax 
benefits that would otherwise result from a “literal application” of other provisions of the 
Act.46 In contrast, in Copthorne,47 the Supreme Court states that the GAAR applies to 
transactions that are “in strict compliance with the text of the relevant provisions relied 
upon,”48 without suggesting that the meaning of these provisions is based on a literal 
interpretation. On the contrary, although the Copthorne decision also contrasts “the 
rationale that underlies the words” with “the bare meaning of the words themselves,”49 the 
court is clear that the “traditional statutory interpretation approach” that is used to 
determine “what the words of the statute mean” is a TCP approach that combines “textual, 
contextual and purposive analysis.”50 Indeed, since the GAAR is generally recognized as 
“a provision of last resort,”51 it makes sense that it should apply only where an avoidance 
transaction results in a tax benefit under tax provisions as ordinarily interpreted under the 
TCP approach. 
 
 Since the TCP approach is ultimately constrained by the text of the relevant 
provisions in a way that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR is not, the TCP approach 
does not render the GAAR irrelevant. On the contrary, although these interpretive exercises 
both consider the broader context and purpose of the provisions at issue, the TCP approach 
takes contextual and purposive considerations into account in order to determine the 
meaning of the text, while the interpretive exercise under the GAAR takes these 
 
45 2005 SCC 55 (Mathew). 
46 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraphs 1, 13, and 49; and Mathew, supra note 45, at paragraph 46. 
47 Supra note 11. 
48 Ibid., at paragraph 66. 
49 Ibid., at paragraph 70. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 21. 
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considerations into account in order to determine the object, spirit, and purpose of the 
relevant provisions, which is relied on to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result 
from an avoidance transaction that misuses or abuses the relevant provisions as ordinarily 
interpreted.52 
 
II. Interpreting the Object, Spirit, and Purpose of the Relevant Provisions 
 
Since subsection 245(4) refers to a misuse of provisions and an abuse having regard 
to provisions read as a whole, one might expect that the interpretive exercise under 
subsection 245(4) would involve two inquiries: one regarding the object, spirit, and 
purpose of the specific provisions that may be misused in order to obtain a tax benefit, and 
the other regarding the object, spirit, and purpose of the broader scheme that may have 
been abused by the avoidance transaction at issue.53  Indeed, this was the interpretive 
approach adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,54 
concluding that subsection 245(4) contemplates two tests, one addressing the specific 
provisions at issue and another considering the broader scheme of which they are a part.55 
 
However, in Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, 
concluding that subsection 245(4) “requires a single, unified approach to the textual, 
contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions of the Income Tax Act 
 
52  For a similar point, see Marc Darmo and Olivier Fournier, “Recent Developments Regarding the 
Application of Subsection 245(4)” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Third Tax Conference, 2011 
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), 37:1-33 at 6-7, explaining that the focus 
under subsection 245(4) is “entirely different” from that under ordinary interpretation, since “the words of 
the relevant provision do not necessarily constrain the contextual and purposive analysis in the same way 
that they do under the traditional statutory interpretation approach.” 
53 See, for example, Vern Krishna, Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 6th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 
2000) at 51, stating that the misuse concept “depends upon the object and spirit of the particular provision 
under scrutiny” while the abuse concept is a “wider question” requiring “an examination of the inter-
relationship of the relevant statutory provisions in context.” 
54 2001 FCA 260 (OSFC). 
55 Ibid., at paragraph 60. 
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that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to determine whether there was abusive tax 
avoidance.”56 Although the court did not question this “single unified approach” in its 
subsequent decision in Copthorne,57 its emphasis on the statutory scheme at issue is a 
significant departure from its emphasis in Canada Trustco on the specific provisions relied 
on by the taxpayer. 
 
The following sections consider the interpretation and application of the misuse or 
abuse test in subsection 245(4), examining the interpretive frameworks established by the 
Supreme Court in Canada Trustco and Copthorne and the application of these interpretive 
frameworks in various GAAR cases. As the first section explains, the “single, unified 
approach” adopted in Canada Trustco disregards the text of subsection 245(4), downplays 
the relevance of the schemes of which provisions are a part, and conflates the interpretive 
exercise under the GAAR with the ordinary interpretation of tax provisions under the TCP 
approach. As the second section explains, while the modified interpretive framework 
established in Copthorne is a welcome improvement on the interpretive framework 
established in Canada Trustco, continued adherence to a single unified approach impedes 
the coherent application of the GAAR. 
 
1. The Interpretive Framework in Canada Trustco and Copthorne 
 
 As noted above, in OSFC the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that subsection 
245(4) contemplates separate inquiries into the object, spirit, or purpose of the provisions 
relied on by a taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit, and into the object, spirit, and purpose of 
the broader scheme that may be implicated by the avoidance transaction at issue. Referring 
to these terms collectively as the “policy of the provisions in question or of the Act read as 
a whole,”58 Justice Rothstein stated that a misuse analysis considers each specific provision 
at issue and the policy behind it, while an abuse analysis considers “a wider context, having 
regard to the provisions of the Income Tax Act read as a whole and the policy behind 
 
56 Supra note 4, at paragraph 43. 
57 Supra note 11, at paragraph 73. 
58 OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraph 66. 
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them.”59 Although noting that the French version of subsection 245(4) uses the single word 
“abus” rather than the two words “misuse” and “abuse,” Justice Rothstein considered this 
distinction a matter of “linguistic nuance rather than a shading of the legislative intent,”60 
concluding that the French version should be interpreted to include “both the tests in the 
English version.”61 
 
 In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, for four reasons. 
First, it observed, the French version of subsection 245(4) not only used the single word 
“abus,” but also defined the test non-disjunctively as “d’abus dans l’application de 
dispositions de la presénte loi lue dans son ensemble” (abuse in the application of the 
provisions of the law read as a whole).62 Second, the court added, “Parliament could not 
have intended this two-step approach, which on its face raises the impossible question of 
how one can abuse the Act as a whole without misusing any of its provisions.”63 Third, it 
declared: 
 
There is but one principle of interpretation: to determine the intent of the legislator 
having regard to the text, its context, and other indicators of legislative purpose. 
The policy analysis proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
OSFC is properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive 
approach to interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit.64 
 
 
59 Ibid., at paragraph 61. For a critical analysis of the Court’s use of the word “policy,” which anticipated the 
Supreme Court’s reaction to this term in Canada Trustco, see Brian J. Arnold, “The Long, Slow, Steady 
Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2004) 52:2 Canadian Tax Journal 488, at 498-499, arguing 
that the use of the word “policy” as opposed to “statutory scheme” is “prejudicial to the application of the 
GAAR” since “judges inevitably prefer statutory words over unexpressed notions of parliamentary policy.” 
60 Ibid., at paragraph 60, citing RMM Canadian Enterprises v. The Queen, [1998] 1 CTC 2300 (TCC), at 
paragraph 49, per Justice Bowman.  
61 Ibid., at paragraph 61. 
62 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 38. 
63 Ibid., at paragraph 39. 
64 Ibid., at paragraph 39. 
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Finally, it stated, “courts cannot search for an overriding policy of the Act that is not based 
on a unified, textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions at 
issue,” since such a search would be “incompatible with the roles of reviewing judges” and 
“would run counter to the overall policy of Parliament that tax law be certain, predictable 
and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs”—thereby contradicting rule 
of law principles of legislative supremacy and legal certainty.65 
 
 None of these reasons for rejecting the two-step approach adopted in OSFC 
withstands serious scrutiny. 
 
 Beginning with the French version of the Act, the Supreme Court’s decision not 
only ignores the language in the English version, which refers to an abuse having regard to 
provisions of the Act other than the GAAR read as a whole, but also reads down the French 
version as if it referred only to the abuse of “specific provisions that give rise to the tax 
benefit,” not to an abuse in the application of the provisions of the Act read as a whole 
(“dans son ensemble”). More important, the 2005 amendments to subsection 245(4) 
clarified that the English and French versions both contemplate two separate inquiries, 
since each inquiry is now contained in a separate paragraph and the French version now 
explicitly refers to “un abus dans l’application des dispositions” (an abuse in the application 
of the provisions) in paragraph 245(4)(a) and “un abus dans l’application de ces 
dispositions … lues dans leur ensemble” (an abuse in the application of these provisions 
… read as a whole) in paragraph 245(4)(b), and prefaces these paragraphs with the words 
“selon le cas” (depending on the case).66 Although in Canada Trustco the Supreme Court 
stated that these amendments “would not warrant a different approach to the issues on 
appeal,”67 this conclusion is plainly incorrect with respect to the two-step approach adopted 
in OSFC. 
 
65 Ibid., at paragraphs 41 and 42. 
66 Budget Implementation Act, 2004, No. 2, SC 2005, c. 19, section 52. 
67 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 7, also concluding that the amendments, which were enacted 
to apply retroactively after the case was argued but before the decision was released, “cannot apply at this 
stage of appellate review after the parties argued their cases and the Tax Court judge rendered his decision 
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 The second argument—that Parliament could not have intended a two-step 
approach because it is inconceivable how one could abuse the Act as a whole without 
misusing any of its provisions—ignores the relevance of broader schemes that may be 
implicated by avoidance transactions. While the use of one or more provisions to achieve 
a result that is contrary to their object, spirit, and purpose clearly misuses these provisions, 
the circumvention of a provision may contradict the object, spirit, or purpose of a scheme 
of which the provision is a part without specifically misusing any specific provision.68 As 
a result, while the analysis of a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having regard 
to the provisions of the Act read as a whole may have been “inseparable” on the facts in 
Canada Trustco,69 that is not always the case and separate inquiries may be required to 
ensure that the GAAR is coherently applied. 
 
 The third argument—that there is only “one principle of interpretation” such that 
“the policy analysis proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal  in OSFC is 
properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive approach to 
interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit” —not only misconstrues 
what OSFC understood as “policy” analysis, but also erroneously conflates the TCP 
approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR.70 As explained earlier, the use of 
the term “policy” in OSFC referred to the object, spirit, and purpose of specific provisions 
and the Act read as a whole, not to the second step of the two-step approach that the court 
employed.71 More important, as explained in the first part of this chapter, the interpretive 
exercise under the GAAR differs from ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach.72 
 
on the basis of the GAAR as it read prior to the amendment.” Whether this is correct as a matter of law is an 
interesting question, which the analysis does not address. 
68 See, for example, Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:14, stating that: “For the GAAR to apply when 
a transaction circumvents a specific rule, a legislative scheme that includes the rule will generally have to be 
frustrated.” 
69 Supra note 4, at paragraph 39, citing the Tax Court decision at paragraph 90. 
70 See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
71 See above in the text accompanying notes 59 and 60. 
72 See above in the text accompanying notes 36 to 53. 
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As a result, as the Supreme Court confirmed in Copthorne, although courts may use the 
same TCP approach to determine “what the words of the statute mean” and “the rationale 
that underlies the words,”73 the interpretive exercise under the GAAR involves a very 
different principle of interpretation than that under the TCP approach – one that requires 
courts to perform “the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation” to 
determine whether an avoidance transaction results in a misuse of specific provisions or an 
abuse having regard to the provisions read as a whole.74 
 
Finally, although the Supreme Court rightly held in Canada Trustco that principles 
of legislative supremacy and legal certainty would make it inappropriate to apply the 
GAAR based on an “overriding policy” of the Act that is not “anchored in” an analysis of 
the relevant provisions,75 this is clearly not what Justice Rothstein meant in OSFC when 
he used the word “policy” to refer to the object, spirit, and purpose of specific provisions 
and the Act read as a whole.76 On the contrary, as the decision in OSFC itself indicates, the 
“policy” analysis conducted by the court was based on an analysis of the relevant 
provisions and the broader statutory scheme that was implicated by the transactions at 
issue.77 As a result, as the court explained in Copthorne, while it is not permissible for 
courts to base a finding of abuse on “some broad statement of policy ... which is not 
attached to the provisions at issue,” the GAAR may be applied where an avoidance 
transaction contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of a statutory scheme that is identified 
by a contextual analysis of the provisions comprising the scheme.78 
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Supreme Court did not reject the “single 
unified approach” in Copthorne, but instead reaffirmed the conclusion in Canada Trustco 
 
73 Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 70. 
74 Ibid., at paragraph 66. 
75 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 55. 
76 See above in the text accompanying notes 58 and 59. 
77 OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraphs 73 to 81 and 82 to 101, examining the “policy” behind subsection 
18(13) and the “policy” with respect to loss-trading by corporations and partnerships. 
78 Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 118. 
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that “there is no distinction between an ‘abuse’ and a ‘misuse.’”79 However, by clearly 
distinguishing the interpretive exercise under the GAAR from the TCP approach and 
clarifying that the contextual analysis of a statutory scheme differs from reliance on an 
“overriding policy,” the court modified the interpretive framework established in Canada 
Trustco, lessening the influence of textual considerations in the GAAR analysis and 
increasing the influence of contextual considerations with respect to the schemes that may 
be implicated by the avoidance transactions at issue.80 The following section examines the 
impact of this shifting interpretive framework on key GAAR decisions and interpretive 
deficiencies resulting from continuing adherence to the single unified approach. 
 
2. Application in GAAR Cases 
 
As explained in the previous section, the interpretive framework established in 
Canada Trustco not only combined the two-step approach in OSFC into a single unified 
approach, but also downplayed the relevance of broader schemes in a GAAR analysis and 
increased the importance of textual considerations in a GAAR analysis by conflating the 
TCP approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR. In contrast, the interpretive 
framework established in Copthorne emphasizes the importance of the broader schemes of 
which provisions are a part and lessens the influence of textual considerations, while 
nonetheless adhering to the single unified approach adopted in Canada Trustco. A review 
of key GAAR cases illustrates the impact of these interpretive frameworks on the 




79 Ibid., at paragraph 73, citing Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 43. 
80 For a similar point, see Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:9, explaining that the Copthorne decision 
“could be read as modifying the interpretive exercise proposed under Canada Trustco from a search for the 
underlying rationale of each individual provision in issue to the search for the underlying rationale of ‘the 
scheme under consideration,’ which may include all of the provisions that have been either used or 
circumvented by the impugned transaction.” 
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(1) Impact of Interpretive Frameworks in Canada Trustco and Copthorne 
 
 In Canada Trustco, the taxpayer carried out a circular series of transactions that 
allowed it to deduct capital cost allowance (CCA) on assets that it acquired at little or no 
economic cost and immediately leased back to the vendor of the assets. The minister argued 
that the deductions should be disallowed on the basis that the object, spirit, or purpose of 
the CCA provisions is limited to the recognition of the “real economic cost” of assets that 
are used to earn income.81 Because this argument was based on explanatory notes to the 
GAAR stating that provisions of the Act are “intended to apply to transactions with real 
economic substance,”82 and not on a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions and the 
CCA regime more generally, it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court rejected 
this argument. 
 
 Instead, the court concluded that, since the relevant provisions use the word “cost” 
in the legal sense of “the amount paid to acquire assets” irrespective of financing 
arrangements or amounts at risk,83 other provisions of the Act explicitly limit the deduction 
of costs to amounts that are at risk,84  and ordinary sale-leaseback transactions do not 
contradict the purpose of the capital cost allowance provisions,85 it was impossible to 
conclude that the transactions were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant 
provisions without invoking a concept of “economic substance” that was not based on a 
textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of the CCA provisions.86  It is in this 
context that one should understand the court’s statement that the GAAR cannot be applied 
 
81 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraphs 68 and 70. 
82  Canada, Department of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income Tax (Ottawa: 
Department of Finance, 1988), clause 186, adding that that “tax incentives expressly provided for in the 
legislation” are not intended to be “neutralized.” 
83 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 74. 
84 Ibid., at paragraphs 72 and 74, referring to the at-risk rules for limited partnerships in subsections 96(2.1) 
to (2.7) of the Act. 
85 Ibid., at paragraphs 68 and 74. 
86 Ibid., at paragraph 76. 
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on the basis of an “overriding policy” that is not based on a textual, contextual, and 
purposive interpretation of the provisions at issue.87 
 
 In contrast, several cases decided before Canada Trustco applied the GAAR based 
on a contextual analysis of the relevant statutory scheme, rather than on any “overriding 
policy.” For example, in McNichol v. The Queen,88 where the Tax Court applied the GAAR 
to what it called “a classic example of surplus stripping,”89 the decision turned not on any 
overriding policy against surplus stripping but on a contextual analysis of various 
provisions, concluding that “the scheme of the Act calls for the treatment of distributions 
of corporate property as income.”90 This statement was reaffirmed in RMM Enterprises 
Inc. v. The Queen,91 in which Justice Bowman added that “the Income Tax Act, read as a 
whole envisages that a distribution of corporate surplus to shareholders is to be taxed as a 
payment of dividends.”92 
 
 In Water’s Edge Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. Canada,93 where the taxpayers 
acquired interests in a US partnership and claimed a terminal loss on the disposition of an 
obsolete computer that had been depreciated for US but not Canadian tax purposes, the 
Federal Court of Appeal referred to “the scheme of the capital cost allowance provisions” 
to conclude that the transactions were contrary to the purpose of those provisions “to 
recognize over time costs incurred to acquire capital assets actually used to earn income” 
 
87 Ibid., at paragraph 42. 
88 97 DTC 111 (TCC). 
89 Ibid., at paragraph 24. 
90 Ibid., referring to the taxation of dividends under paragraph 12(1)(j) of the Act, the taxation of shareholder 
benefits under section 15, and the rules for deemed dividends in section 84. A more thorough analysis might 
also have referred to sections 84.1 and 212.1 and mentioned exceptions to this scheme such as the exclusion 
of capital dividends in subsection 83(2). 
91 Supra note 61. 
92 Ibid., at paragraph 53. 
93 2002 FCA 291. 
 21 
under the Act.94 Similarly, in OSFC,95 where the transactions relied on the stop-loss rule in 
subsection 18(13) (as it then read) to transfer accrued losses to a non-arm’s-length 
partnership, the interests in which were then sold to arm’s-length parties who deducted 
their share of the losses when realized by the partnership, the Federal Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that the transactions abused a statutory “policy” against the transfer of corporate 
losses among arm’s-length persons was based on a contextual analysis of provisions of the 
Act, including, in particular, the loss-restriction rule in subsection 111(5). 
 
 However, after the Supreme Court decision in Canada Trustco, lower courts 
became much less willing to rely on the statutory scheme in applying the GAAR.  For 
example, in Evans v. The Queen,96 where the minister argued that a series of transactions 
was “nothing more than a surplus strip” to which the GAAR should apply,97 the Tax Court 
allowed the taxpayer’s appeal on the grounds that each provision operated “exactly the way 
it is supposed to do” and the only basis on which it could uphold the minister’s application 
of the GAAR “would be to find that there is some overarching principle of Canadian tax 
law that requires that corporate distributions to shareholders must be taxed as dividends” 
which “is precisely what the Supreme Court of Canada has said we cannot do.”98 Although 
it is not clear that the transactions involved surplus stripping as much as income splitting,99 
the impact of Canada Trustco is clear. 
 
94 Ibid., at paragraphs 41 and 42. 
95 Supra note 55, at paragraphs 82 to 98, considering the “policy” with respect to loss-trading by corporations. 
96 2005 TCC 684 (Evans). 
97 The specific transactions involved the payment of a stock dividend to the taxpayer, the sale of these shares 
to a limited partnership in which the taxpayer’s three minor children each held a 33 percent interest in 
exchange for a promissory note, and the payment of dividends on the shares that were used to make payments 
of principal and interest on the promissory notes. 
98 Evans, supra note 97, at paragraph 30. 
99 Although the dividends were included in computing the income of the taxpayer’s minor children, tax 
otherwise payable on the dividends was sheltered by the personal tax credit and the dividend tax credit. As a 
result, the transactions did not actually strip the corporate surplus but shifted the tax on the surplus to the 
taxpayer’s children. This aspect of the transactions is an interesting issue that was not addressed by the court. 
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 In Landrus v. The Queen,100  the minister disallowed the taxpayer’s share of a 
terminal loss realized by a limited partnership of which he was a member on the basis that 
the loss was “only a paper loss” resulting from a disposition of the property to another 
limited partnership in which the taxpayer acquired an interest.101 The Tax Court rejected 
the Crown’s argument that specific stop-loss provisions (none of which specifically applied 
to the transactions) evidenced a “general policy” to disregard losses on dispositions of 
property within “the same economic unit.”102 According to the court, “the particularity with 
which Parliament has specified the relationship that must exist between the transferor and 
transferee for the purpose of each stop-loss rule … is more indicative that these rules are 
exceptions to a general policy of allowing losses on all dispositions.”103 
 
 In Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. The Queen,104 the taxpayer carried out a series 
of transactions that allowed it to increase cross-border paid-up capital (PUC) from CAD 
475,000 to CAD167 million without the investment of tax-paid funds and then to distribute 
CAD104 million as a tax-free return of capital.105 The Tax Court relied on Canada Trustco 
 
However, it is notable that the transactions would have been subject to the tax on split income if they had 
been carried out after the TOSI was enacted in 1999. 
100 2008 TCC 274, aff’d. 2009 FCA 113 (Landrus). 
101 Ibid., at paragraph 83. 
102 Ibid., at paragraph 114. 
103 Ibid., at paragraph 120. 
104 2009 TCC 299, aff’d. 2010 FCA 251 (Collins & Aikman). 
105 The specific transactions involved the sale by the taxpayer (a US company) to a newly incorporated 
Canadian company (Newco) of low-PUC and high fair market value (FMV) shares of a non-resident holding 
company (Holdco) that held shares of Canadian operating companies (Opcos), the continuation of Holdco 
into Canada, its amalgamation with the Opcos, the payment of an inter-corporate dividend to Newco, and the 
payment of CAD104 million by Newco to the taxpayer as a return of capital. Although section 212.1 would 
have reduced the PUC of the Newco shares issued to the taxpayer in exchange for the Holdco shares if Holdco 
had been resident in Canada at the time, it did not apply because Holdco had not yet continued into Canada. 
Although paragraph 128.1(1)(c.1) would now deem Holdco to have received a dividend equal to the 
difference between the FMV and the PUC of the Opco shares when it became resident in Canada, the 
transactions occurred before this provision was enacted in 1998. 
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to dismiss the Crown’s argument that the transactions were contrary to a statutory scheme 
against surplus stripping. Citing Canada Trustco for the proposition that the GAAR cannot 
be applied based on an overriding policy that is not based on a textual, contextual, and 
purposive analysis of the relevant provisions,106 the court rejected the Crown’s assertion 
that the Act includes a scheme against surplus stripping on the grounds that this premise 
“is not evidenced in the legislation,” nor in extrinsic aids to its interpretation.107 
 
 Similarly in Gwartz v. Canada, 108  where the taxpayer engaged in a series of 
transactions to convert dividends that would otherwise have been subject to the tax on split 
income (TOSI) under section 120.4 into capital gains that were not subject to the TOSI 
during the years at issue, 109  the Tax Court rejected the minister’s argument that the 
transactions abusively circumvented this provision on the grounds, among others, that “a 
broad policy in the ITA against income splitting, grounded in specific provisions of the 
ITA, other than subsection 120.4, has not been recognized.”110 Like Collins & Aikman, this 
decision adhered closely to the text of the relevant provisions, concluding that the existence 
of specific statutory provisions to prevent income splitting and surplus stripping suggests 
that “Parliament was well aware” of opportunities to circumvent section 120.4 by 
converting dividends into capital gains, 111  as a result of which it followed that “the 
 
106 Collins & Aikman, supra note 105, at paragraph 61. 
107 Ibid., at paragraph 65. 
108 2013 TCC 86 (Gwartz). 
109  The specific transactions involved the payment by a company controlled by the taxpayer of stock 
dividends with low PUC and high FMV to a family trust of which the taxpayer’s minor children were 
beneficiaries, the sale by the trust of these shares to the taxpayer in exchange for a promissory note (triggering 
capital gains that were allocated to the trust’s minor beneficiaries), the sale by the taxpayer of the shares to a 
company controlled by his spouse in exchange for a promissory note, the redemption of the shares by the 
taxpayer’s wife’s company, the use of the proceeds from the share redemption to repay the promissory note 
owing to the taxpayer, and the use of these proceeds by the taxpayer to repay the promissory note owing to 
the trust. The gains at issue in the case were realized in 2003, 2004 and 2005 before the enactment of 
subsections 120.4(4) and (5), which made capital gains from non-arm’s-length share disposition subject to 
the TOSI. 
110 Gwartz, supra note 109, at paragraph 53. 
111 Ibid., at paragraph 67. 
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transactions … did not circumvent the application of section 120.4 in a manner that 
constituted abusive tax avoidance for the purpose of subsection 245(4).”112 
 
 In contrast, in Copthorne,113 the Supreme Court applied the GAAR on the basis of 
a statutory scheme with respect to PUC. The taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions 
to convert what would otherwise have been a vertical amalgamation subject to a reduction 
in PUC under subsection 87(3) into a horizontal amalgamation that was not subject to this 
PUC grind, allowing it to distribute a non-taxable return of capital in excess of capital 
invested in the corporate group. The Supreme Court held that the transactions were subject 
to the GAAR on the basis that subsection 87(3) is part of a statutory scheme (“the PUC 
scheme of the Act”) the purpose of which is to “allow … for a return of tax-paid 
investment” in a corporation “without inclusion in income” while “precluding the 
preservation of PUC where such preservation would allow for a withdrawal, without 
liability for tax, of an amount in excess of the investment made with tax-paid funds.”114 
Rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that the specificity of detailed PUC reductions in the 
Act excluded the application of the GAAR to transactions that were not themselves subject 
to a specific provision,115 the court observed that this “implied exclusion” argument would 
render the GAAR meaningless, since the GAAR applies only to transactions that are not 
subject to provisions as ordinarily interpreted.116 As a result, it concluded that, while a close 
adherence to the text of the relevant provisions is appropriate in “a case of traditional 
statutory interpretation,”117 this approach in misplaced in a GAAR analysis, which relies 
on “the underlying rationale or object, spirit, and purpose of the legislation” not “the text 
of the statute.”118 
 
112 Ibid., at paragraph 79. 
113 Supra note 11. 
114 Ibid., at paragraph 96. 
115 Ibid., at paragraph 108, arguing that “the detail of the PUC provisions, such as s. 87(3) suggest that where 
the taxpayer’s actions are not caught by a provision, the actions cannot abuse the purpose of a provision.” 
116 Ibid., at paragraph 111, citing OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraph 63. 
117 Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 108. 
118 Ibid., at paragraph 109. 
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Based on Copthorne, one might reasonably question the conclusions in Collins & 
Aikman and Gwartz that the GAAR did not apply. In Collins & Aikman, the transactions 
may not have been subject to specific provisions of the Act but they clearly contradicted 
the PUC scheme of the Act identified in Copthorne, since they allowed the taxpayer to 
withdraw, without any tax, an amount greatly exceeding its investment with tax-paid funds. 
In Gwartz, the court’s conclusion that the transactions did not contradict the object, spirit, 
and purpose of section 120.4 turns on the same type of implied-exclusion argument that 
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Copthorne. Indeed, subsequent cases have applied 
the GAAR to surplus-stripping and income-splitting transactions partly on the basis that 
these transactions contradict statutory schemes in the Act.119 
 
In contrast, it is difficult to disagree with the court’s conclusion in Landrus that the 
particularity of the various stop-loss rules in the Act does not support the existence of a 
general policy or scheme to disregard losses on dispositions of property within the same 
economic unit, regardless of how this concept may be defined. As a result, it is not 
surprising that the court’s conclusion on this issue has been reaffirmed in more than one 
subsequent GAAR case.120 
 
Based on Copthorne, one might also challenge the Federal Court of Appeal’s 
conclusions in OSFC that the loss-trading transactions at issue did not contradict the object, 
spirit, and purpose of the stop-loss rule in subsection 18(13) (as it then read) or the 
partnership allocation rules in subsection 96(1). Although the court held that the 
 
119 See, for example, 1245989 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada, sub nom. Wild v. Canada, 2017 TCC 51, rev’d. 2018 
FCA 114 (on other grounds) (Wild), referring to the PUC scheme of the Act to deny a tax benefit that would 
otherwise have resulted from a series of transactions designed to extract corporate surpluses on a tax-free 
basis; and Gervais v. Canada, 2016 TCC 180, aff’d. 2018 FCA 3, referring to the scheme of the Act governing 
transfers of property and the attribution of income between spouses to conclude that a series of transactions 
designed to split income was subject to the GAAR. 
120 See, for example, 1207192 Ontario Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 383 at paragraph 81; and 2012 FCA 
258 (Triad Gestco). 
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transactions had not misused subsection 18(13) on the grounds that the purpose of the 
provision at the time was not only to preclude the realization of a superficial loss on the 
disposition of property to a non-arm’s length person, but also to preserve the loss “for 
recognition on a later occasion by the non-arm’s length transferee,”121 this conclusion was 
based on a close textual analysis of the provision that contradicts the broader purposive 
approach mandated by Copthorne. The court’s conclusion that loss trading did not 
contradict the partnership allocation rules in subsection 96(1) was also based on a textual 
analysis of this provision,122 as well as on the implied exclusion principle that Copthorne 
dismissed as unsuitable in a GAAR analysis.123 
 
Therefore, not surprisingly, these conclusions were rejected in subsequent GAAR 
cases. In Mathew,124 which involved the same series of transactions as those in OSFC, the 
Supreme Court criticized the Federal Court of Appeal’s “narrow textual analysis” of 
subsection 18(13),125 concluding instead that the purpose of this provision was to disallow 
and preserve a loss by transferring it to a non-arm’s-length transferee “because it essentially 
remains in the transferor’s control,”126 and that the transactions “frustrated Parliament’s 
purpose of confining the transfer of the losses … to a non-arm’s-length partnership.”127 In 
Canada v. 594710 British Columbia Ltd., 128  the taxpayer participated in a series of 
 
121 OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraph 77. 
122 Ibid., at paragraph 99, stating that the partnership allocation rules contained “no restrictions on loss trading 
at the relevant time.” 
123 Ibid., at paragraph 100, concluding that the rule against loss trading with foreign partnerships in subsection 
96(8) “highlights the fact that in the case of partnerships other than foreign partnerships, accumulated losses, 
prior to the entry of a new partner, are available to that partner.” 
124 Supra note 45, at paragraph 42. 
125 Ibid., at paragraph 42. 
126 Ibid., at paragraphs 53 and 54. This distinction between the purpose of the provision and the method by 
which the purpose is achieved is effectively illustrated by subsequent amendments to subsection 18(13) and 
most other stop-loss rules to preserve the disallowed loss in the hands of the transferor to be realized when 
the transferee disposes of the property to an unaffiliated person. 
127 Ibid. at paragraph 62. 
128 2018 FCA 116 (594710 British Columbia). 
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transactions intended to allocate taxable income of a partnership to an arm’s length 
corporation with accumulated non-capital losses. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded 
that the transactions were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of subsection 96(1), on 
the grounds that the purpose of this provision is to allocate income or losses among the 
members of a partnership who are entitled to these amounts because they were members 
of the partnership when the transactions occurred,129and  not “to allocate taxable income 
in a manner that does not assist the organizational structure of the partnership or the 
efficient conduct of the partnership business.”130 
 
Similarly, in Canada v. Oxford Properties Group Inc., 131  where the taxpayer 
carried out an elaborate series of transactions in order to avoid recapture of depreciation on 
the sale of real estate properties by transferring them on a tax-deferred basis through a 
tiered partnership structure, increasing the adjusted cost base of the partnership interests, 
and selling these interests to tax-exempt purchasers, the Federal Court of Appeal criticized 
the Tax Court’s GAAR analysis on the basis that it was based narrowly on the text of the 
provisions rather than on their object, spirit, and purpose.132 According to the Court, the 
purpose of excluding depreciable capital property from the bump provisions in subsections 
88(1) and 98(3) is to prevent “property that is taxed on the basis of a 50% rate of inclusion 
to augment the [tax cost] of property that is taxed on the basis of a 100% rate of 
inclusion,”133 and that a purpose of subsection 100(1) is to ensure that tax is paid on the 
 
129 Ibid., at paragraphs 52 to 54, citing the House of Commons debates prior to the introduction of section 30 
of the Income War Tax Act, RSC 1927, c. 97, on which subsection 96(1) is based, and stating that the notion 
of entitlement “reflects the foundational principle of the Act that taxpayers are to be taxed on their own 
earnings, and not the earnings of someone else.” 
130 594710 British Columbia., supra note 129, at paragraph 59. 
131 2018 FCA 30. 
132 Ibid., at paragraphs 88 and 101. 
133 Ibid., at paragraph 78. These provisions generally allow taxpayers to increase the adjusted cost base of 
non-depreciable capital property on the windup of a subsidiary into a parent and the dissolution of a 
partnership to the extent that the adjusted cost base of the parent’s shares of the subsidiary or the partner’s 
interest in the partnership exceeds the cost amount of property received by the parent on the windup of the 
subsidiary or the partner on the dissolution of the partnership. 
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latent recapture with respect to a partnership’s depreciable property “which would 
otherwise go unpaid on a subsequent sale of the depreciable property by the tax-exempt 
purchaser.” 134  On this basis, it held that the transactions frustrated the purpose of 
subsection 100(1) to the extent that they allowed the taxpayer to avoid tax on the latent 
recapture,135  defeated the rationale for excluding depreciable property from the bump 
provisions since property subject to tax on the basis of a 50 percent rate of inclusion was 
used to prevent recapture on property subject to a 100 percent rate of inclusion,136 and 
abused the rollover provisions in subsections 97(2) and (4) because the subsequent 
transactions converted the deferred recapture on the transfer of the real estate properties to 
the partnerships into a permanent exclusion.137 Therefore, as in Copthorne, the application 
of the GAAR turned on a broad contextual and purposive analysis of the relevant statutory 
provisions. 
 
The decision in Copthorne also confirms that it is misleading to suggest, as some 
GAAR decisions have done, that the GAAR cannot be applied to deny tax benefits resulting 
from a gap in the legislation.138 Although such a conclusion is appropriate in cases where 
a presumed scheme (such as disallowing losses on dispositions of property within the same 
“economic unit”) is not sufficiently well-established to determine that the transaction at 
 
134 Ibid., at paragraph 101. This provision applies, among other circumstances, where a taxpayer disposes of 
a partnership interest to a tax-exempt entity, deeming the capital gain to be the total of (a) one-half of the 
capital gain as may reasonably be regarded as attributable to increases in the value of non-depreciable capital 
property held directly by the partnership or indirectly through one or more other partnerships, and (b) the 
whole of the remaining portion of the capital gain. 
135 Ibid., at paragraph 101. 
136 Ibid., at paragraph 112. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See Geransky v. Canada, 2001 D.T.C. 243 (TCC) at paragraph 42, stating that the minister cannot rely on 
the GAAR to “fill in any gaps not covered by the multitude of specific anti-avoidance provisions” in the Act 
when they are applied “in accordance with their terms;” Landrus, supra note 101, at paragraph 124, 
concluding that the minister’s use of the GAAR to “fill the gaps left by Parliament in subsection 85(5.1) … 
is an inappropriate use of the GAAR”; and Collins & Aikman, supra note 105, at paragraph 109, stating that 
the use of the GAAR “to fill in what [the Minister] perceives to be a possible gap left by Parliament … would 
be an inappropriate use of the GAAR”. 
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issue results in a misuse or abuse of the relevant provisions, it is incorrect where the 
existence of a statutory scheme (such as the PUC scheme of the Act) is clear enough to 
conclude that the transaction contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant 
provisions.139 As a result, while the Federal Court of Appeal has rightly held that the 
Crown’s burden to establish that a transaction results in a misuse or abuse cannot be 
discharged “merely by asserting that the transaction was not foreseen or that it exploits a 
previously unnoticed legislative gap,”140  the identification of a statutory scheme may 
suggest that the exploitation of a previously unnoticed legislative gap constitutes abusive 
tax avoidance. In this circumstance, as the Tax Court has stated, the purpose and effect of 
the GAAR is “to close the gaps that sophisticated tax plans seek to exploit.”141 
 
(2) Deficiencies of the Single Unified Approach 
 
 Although Copthorne established that the GAAR can be applied based on a 
contextual analysis of a statutory scheme without relying on an “overriding policy”, it did 
not challenge the “single unified approach” adopted in Canada Trustco which emphasizes 
“the specific provisions in issue” rather than the broader statutory scheme of which they 
may be a part.142 As a result, although the contextual analysis of a statutory scheme may 
inform a court’s interpretation of the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions, 
the application of the GAAR appears to depend on a conclusion that the avoidance 
transaction at issue contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of one or more specific 
provisions, rather than the scheme itself. 
 
 
139 In other words, as the Tax Court stated in Gwartz, supra note 109, at paragraph 48, “it is inappropriate, 
where the transactions do not otherwise conflict with the object, spirit and purpose of the provisions of the 
ITA, to rely on the GAAR to deny a tax benefit resulting from a taxpayer’s reliance on a previously unnoticed 
legislative gap.”  (emphasis added). 
140 Lehigh Cement Ltd. v. Canada, 2010 FCA 124, at paragraph 37 [emphasis added]. 
141 Wild, supra note 120, at paragraph 101. 
142 Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 41. 
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 For example, in Copthorne, the court’s conclusion that the transactions resulted in 
a misuse or abuse within the meaning of subsection 245(4) did not depend directly on a 
conclusion that they were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the PUC scheme of 
the Act, but instead, that they were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the PUC 
reduction for vertical amalgamations in subsection 87(3) – which the court interpreted in 
light of its contextual analysis of the statutory scheme for PUC. Similarly. in Triad 
Gestco143 where the transactions entered into by the taxpayer created an offsetting capital 
gain and loss, but only the loss was realized for tax purposes, the Federal Court of Appeal 
held that the transactions were subject to the GAAR not because the creation of a paper 
loss was contrary to the “underlying policy” of the statutory scheme for capital gains and 
losses to recognize “real gains and losses” that affect a taxpayer’s “economic power,”144 
but because they resulted in “an abuse and misuse of the relevant provisions, specifically 
paragraphs 38(b), 39(1)(b) and 40(1)(b).”145 
 
 Although the decision in each of these cases, namely, that the GAAR should apply 
is justified, the analysis is unsatisfactory, since it reads into otherwise relatively mechanical 
provisions of the Act an object, spirit, and purpose that properly inheres in the statutory 
scheme as a whole rather than in the individual provisions themselves.146 Therefore, it 
would have been more persuasive for the courts to have concluded that these transactions 
abused the provisions of the relevant statutory schemes read as a whole, instead of 
concluding that they abused or misused specific provisions. For this reason, the single 





143 Supra note 121. 
144 Ibid., at paragraphs 47 and 41-42. 
145 Ibid., at paragraph 50. 
146 For a similar point, see Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:12, explaining that a purposive analysis 
is “generally unhelpful” for technical or computational provisions, the underlying rationale of which is best 




This chapter has examined the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, contrasting 
this interpretive exercise with ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, and 
critically evaluating the interpretive framework that the Supreme Court has established for 
this interpretive exercise in Canada Trustco and Copthorne. 
 
As the first part of the chapter explains, although the TCP approach and the 
interpretive exercise under the GAAR both consider the text, context, and purpose of the 
provisions at issue, the aim and function of these interpretive exercises differ, since the 
TCP approach relies on textual, contextual, and purposive analysis in order to determine 
the meaning of the words at issue, while a GAAR analysis employs this method of 
interpretation to determine the “the rationale that underlies the words” that is relied upon 
to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result from an avoidance transaction that 
contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions or the broader scheme 
of which they are a part. As a result, the TCP approach is constrained by the text of the 
relevant provisions in a way that a GAAR analysis is not – reflecting rule-of-law principles 
of legislative supremacy and legal certainty, the latter of which is legitimately superseded 
by an anti-abuse principle in the context of a GAAR. 
 
As the second part of the chapter explains, the single unified approach adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco disregards the text of subsection 245(4), which 
clearly distinguishes between a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having regard 
to these provisions read as a whole, downplays the relevance of broader statutory schemes 
in the application of the GAAR, and conflates the interpretive exercise under the GAAR 
with the ordinary interpretation of tax provisions under the TCP approach thereby 
exaggerating the role of textual considerations in a GAAR analysis. To the extent that 
Copthorne modified this interpretive framework by lessening the influence of textual 
considerations and increasing the influence of contextual considerations in GAAR 
analysis, it is a welcome development that has had a significant impact on GAAR 
decisions. However, continued adherence to the single unified approach adopted in Canada 
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Trustco is contrary to the text of subsection 245(4) and may also impede the coherent 
application of the GAAR. 
